Grav: Twig sandbox allows editor-role users to exfiltrate all plugin secrets via Config::toArray()
CVE-2026-44738GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (getgrav/grav 2.0.0-rc.2), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Packagist getgrav/grav
- Affected
- <= 2.0.0-rc.1
- Fixed in
- 2.0.0-rc.2
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 lists affected ranges: Packagist getgrav/grav >=0 <=2.0.0-rc.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.7 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-44738: 0.28% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 20.05 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary The Twig sandbox allow-list permits any user with the admin.pages role to call config.toArray() from within a page body, dumping the entire merged site configuration — including all plugin secrets (SMTP passwords, AWS keys, OAuth client secrets, API tokens) — into the rendered HTML. No administrator privileges are required. Details The Twig sandbox allow-list in system/config/security.yaml explicitly permits Config::toArray() for the Grav\Common\Config\Config class: The config object — which holds the full merged configuration tree including every key under plugins. — is injected into every sandboxed render in system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Twig.php (line 292): Any editor with admin.pages can save a page with process.twig: true in the frontmatter and the following payload in the body: When the page is rendered, the full config tree is dumped as JSON in the HTML, including all plugin secrets stored under user/config/plugins/.yaml. PoC Impact Any user with the editor role…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-44738 Advisory: Grav: Twig sandbox allows editor-role users to exfiltrate all plugin secrets via Config::toArray() IDs: CVE-2026-44738, GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-44738 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:40 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.7) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: getgrav/grav 2.0.0-rc.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Packagist getgrav/grav: affected <= 2.0.0-rc.1; fixed in 2.0.0-rc.2 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Packagist getgrav/grav: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on getgrav/grav. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 lists affected ranges: Packagist getgrav/grav >=0 <=2.0.0-rc.1) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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