Coder vulnerable to workspace auto-creation via crafted URL parameters without user consent
CVE-2026-44454GHSA-m3cr-vc2j-pm27
What to do
Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/coder/coder
- Affected
- <= 0.27.3
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Go github.com/coder/coder/v2
- Affected
- < 2.29.7>= 2.30.0, < 2.30.2
- Fixed in
- 2.29.7, 2.30.2
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-m3cr-vc2j-pm27 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/coder/coder/v2 >=0 =2.30.0 =0 <=0.27.3
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 8.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-44454: 2.64% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 85.61 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Command injection via dotfiles URI parameter combined with workspace auto-creation Summary The dotfiles registry module passed unsanitized user input to shell commands, allowing arbitrary code execution inside a provisioned workspace. Any user who supplied a crafted dotfilesuri value (for example, one containing shell command substitution such as $(...)) could achieve command execution in their own workspace. The Create Workspace page's mode=auto deep links amplified this into a one-click attack: an attacker could craft a URL that prefilled param.dotfilesuri and silently provisioned a workspace with the attacker-controlled value, with no explicit user confirmation. Details Command injection in the dotfiles module (root cause) The dotfiles module interpolated the user-provided dotfilesuri value directly into a shell script and executed it without input validation. Because the value was expanded by the shell, payloads using command substitution ($(...)), command separators (;, |, &&),…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-m3cr-vc2j-pm27
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-44454 Advisory: Coder vulnerable to workspace auto-creation via crafted URL parameters without user consent IDs: CVE-2026-44454, GHSA-m3cr-vc2j-pm27 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-44454 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:24 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 8.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: github.com/coder/coder/v2 2.30.2, 2.29.7. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/coder/coder: affected <= 0.27.3 - Go github.com/coder/coder/v2: affected < 2.29.7; >= 2.30.0, < 2.30.2; fixed in 2.29.7, 2.30.2 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/coder/coder: check the installed version with your package manager. - Go github.com/coder/coder/v2: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/coder/coder, github.com/coder/coder/v2. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m3cr-vc2j-pm27 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-m3cr-vc2j-pm27 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/coder/coder/v2 >=0 =2.30.0 =0 <=0.27.3) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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