New API is vulnerable to CSRF through user email binding

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-44342: 0.19% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 8.87 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The email and WeChat account binding endpoints used GET requests for state-changing account operations. In deployments where session cookies could be sent on cross-site navigations, an attacker could trigger a logged-in user's browser to bind an attacker-controlled email address or OAuth identity. Affected endpoints included: - GET /api/oauth/email/bind - GET /api/oauth/wechat/bind Impact A successful attack could change account binding state. For email binding, the attacker could bind an email address they control and then attempt follow-on account recovery flows. The default session cookie configuration uses SameSite=Strict, which mitigates common cross-site navigation attacks in modern browsers, so the issue is rated Medium. Affected versions Versions before v0.12.0-alpha.1 are affected. Patches This issue is fixed in v0.12.0-alpha.1. The fix changes email and WeChat binding routes from GET to POST and reads parameters from a JSON request body instead of query parameters.…

Published by the source

7 Jul 2026, 13:01 UTC

Last modified by the source

7 Jul 2026, 13:01 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:24 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-44342

Advisory: New API is vulnerable to CSRF through user email binding
IDs: CVE-2026-44342, GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-44342 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:24 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/QuantumNous/new-api 0.12.0-alpha.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/QuantumNous/new-api: affected < 0.12.0-alpha.1; fixed in 0.12.0-alpha.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/QuantumNous/new-api: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/QuantumNous/new-api.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m lists affected ranges: Go github.com/QuantumNous/new-api >=0 <0.12.0-alpha.1)

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