gitsign --verify panics on empty-certificate PKCS7 and exits 0, bypassing exit-code callers

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.4 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

EPSS

• CVE-2026-44310: 0.13% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 2.72 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary CertVerifier.Verify() in pkg/git/verifier.go unconditionally dereferences certs[0] after sd.GetCertificates() without checking the slice length. A CMS/PKCS7 signed message with an empty certificate set is a structurally valid DER payload; GetCertificates() returns an empty slice with no error, causing an immediate index-out-of-range panic. On the gitsign --verify code path (the GPG-compatible mode invoked by git verify-commit), the panic is silently recovered by internal/io/streams.go's Wrap() function, which returns nil instead of an error. main.go then exits with code 0, causing exit-code-only verification callers to interpret the failed verification as success. Severity Medium (CVSS 3.1: 5.8) CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L - Attack Vector: Network — attacker pushes a commit carrying a crafted signature to any accessible repository, or delivers the signature file out-of-band - Attack Complexity: Low — stripping certificates from a PKCS7 object requires only…

Published by the source

8 May 2026, 17:37 UTC

Last modified by the source

15 May 2026, 23:49 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:22 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-7c37-gx6w-8vc5

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-44310

Advisory: gitsign --verify panics on empty-certificate PKCS7 and exits 0, bypassing exit-code callers
IDs: CVE-2026-44310, GHSA-7c37-gx6w-8vc5
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-44310 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:22 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.4)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/sigstore/gitsign 0.15.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/sigstore/gitsign: affected >= 0.4.0, < 0.15.0; fixed in 0.15.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/sigstore/gitsign: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/sigstore/gitsign.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7c37-gx6w-8vc5 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7c37-gx6w-8vc5 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/sigstore/gitsign >=0.4.0 <0.15.0)

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