Elo JavaScript emitter has sandbox escape to arbitrary Node.js / browser code execution via unfiltered .constructor member access
CVE-2026-44267GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (@enspirit/elo 1.0.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @enspirit/elo
- Affected
- < 1.0.1
- Fixed in
- 1.0.1
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5 lists affected ranges: npm @enspirit/elo >=0 <=1.0.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5 lists affected ranges: npm @enspirit/elo >=0 <1.0.1 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 9.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary An unauthenticated attacker who controls a string passed to any Elo JavaScript-emission path — `defaultFormats.elo.parse()`, the `bin/elo` CLI, or the live browser playground at `elo-lang.org/try` — can execute arbitrary code in the host JavaScript runtime. A payload built from the `.constructor.constructor` chain compiles, without modification, to a live `Function` invocation in the emitted JavaScript, escaping any sandbox assumption around "Elo is a safe data/DSL language."
Vulnerable sink and root cause Three interacting sites in `src/` produce the bug at commit `749af7b`: 1. `src/transform.ts:144–158` — the `member_access` handler allows access on types `any`, `object`, or `array` without filtering the property name. This is the only place an integrator could have plugged a denylist. 2. `src/compilers/javascript.ts:210` — the JS emitter writes `${objectExpr}.${ir.property}` verbatim into the output, so any property name that survives the transform step…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-44267 Advisory: Elo JavaScript emitter has sandbox escape to arbitrary Node.js / browser code execution via unfiltered `.constructor` member access IDs: CVE-2026-44267, GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-44267 (revision 2, source checked 4 Nov 2026, 06:10 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.8) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @enspirit/elo 1.0.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @enspirit/elo: affected < 1.0.1; fixed in 1.0.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @enspirit/elo --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @enspirit/elo. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5 lists affected ranges: npm @enspirit/elo >=0 <=1.0.0) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5 (OSV record GHSA-33r5-xmm8-v6x5 lists affected ranges: npm @enspirit/elo >=0 <1.0.1 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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