AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect and DNS Rebinding in isSSRFSafeURL()
CVE-2026-43884GHSA-2hch-c97c-g99x
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Packagist wwbn/avideo
- Affected
- <= 29.0
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-2hch-c97c-g99x lists affected ranges: Packagist wwbn/avideo >=0 <=29.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.7 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-43884: 0.35% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 28.43 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary Two endpoints in AVideo call isSSRFSafeURL() to validate user-supplied URLs, then fetch them using bare filegetcontents() without disabling PHP's automatic redirect following. An attacker can supply a URL pointing to a server they control that returns a 302 redirect to an internal/cloud-metadata address (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/). Since isSSRFSafeURL() only validates the initial URL, the redirect target bypasses all SSRF protections. A secondary finding is that 6+ callers of isSSRFSafeURL() discard the $resolvedIP out-parameter meant for DNS pinning, leaving them vulnerable to DNS rebinding TOCTOU attacks. Severity: High — CVSS 3.1: 7.7 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N) Details Finding 1: Redirect-Based SSRF Bypass Vulnerable code — plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php (line ~162–165): Vulnerable code — objects/EpgParser.php (line ~358–362): Safe code for comparison — objects/functions.php, urlgetcontents(): Root cause: The SSRF redirect protection…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-2hch-c97c-g99x
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-43884 Advisory: AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect and DNS Rebinding in isSSRFSafeURL() IDs: CVE-2026-43884, GHSA-2hch-c97c-g99x Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-43884 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:40 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.7) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Packagist wwbn/avideo: affected <= 29.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Packagist wwbn/avideo: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on wwbn/avideo. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2hch-c97c-g99x (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-2hch-c97c-g99x lists affected ranges: Packagist wwbn/avideo >=0 <=29.0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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