AVideo: Unauthenticated CRLF/ICS Injection in Scheduler downloadICS.php Allows Calendar Event Spoofing
CVE-2026-43882GHSA-mwgh-92m2-wvhv
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Packagist wwbn/avideo
- Affected
- <= 29.0
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-mwgh-92m2-wvhv lists affected ranges: Packagist wwbn/avideo >=0 <=29.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 4.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-43882: 0.21% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 11.72 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary The unauthenticated plugin/Scheduler/downloadICS.php endpoint passes attacker-controlled title, description, and joinURL parameters into Scheduler::downloadICS(), which builds an ICS calendar file via the ICS helper class. ICS::escapestring() (objects/ICS.php:167-169) only escapes , and ; and does NOT neutralize CR/LF, so attacker CRLF bytes inside a property value break out and inject arbitrary ICS lines — including END:VEVENT / BEGIN:VEVENT pairs that add entire attacker-controlled calendar events. Because the malicious .ics file is served from the victim's trusted AVideo origin, this enables high-credibility calendar phishing: forged meetings with attacker-chosen SUMMARY, URL, LOCATION, and DESCRIPTION landing in the victim's calendar after import. Details Vulnerable code path plugin/Scheduler/downloadICS.php — unauthenticated entry point: There is no session check, no CSRF token, no user-role check — only an empty-check on title/datestart and a plugin-enabled check.…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-mwgh-92m2-wvhv
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-43882 Advisory: AVideo: Unauthenticated CRLF/ICS Injection in Scheduler downloadICS.php Allows Calendar Event Spoofing IDs: CVE-2026-43882, GHSA-mwgh-92m2-wvhv Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-43882 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:40 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 4.3) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Packagist wwbn/avideo: affected <= 29.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Packagist wwbn/avideo: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on wwbn/avideo. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mwgh-92m2-wvhv (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-mwgh-92m2-wvhv lists affected ranges: Packagist wwbn/avideo >=0 <=29.0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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