Prometheus Azure AD remote write OAuth client secret exposed via config API

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-42151: 0.35% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 28.91 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact Users who use Azure AD remote write with OAuth authentication are impacted. The clientsecret field in the Azure AD remote write OAuth configuration (storage/remote/azuread) was typed as string instead of Secret. Prometheus redacts fields of type Secret when serving the configuration via the /-/config HTTP API endpoint. Because the field was a plain string, the Azure OAuth client secret was exposed in plaintext to any user or process with access to that endpoint. Patches The problem has been patched by changing ClientSecret in OAuthConfig to Secret. Users should upgrade to 3.11.3 or 3.5.3 LTS. Workarounds Users who can not upgrade can switch to Managed Identity or Workload Identity authentication for Azure AD remote write, which do not involve a client secret.

Published by the source

5 May 2026, 19:33 UTC

Last modified by the source

9 Sep 2026, 15:34 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:29 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-wg65-39gg-5wfj

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-42151

Advisory: Prometheus Azure AD remote write OAuth client secret exposed via config API
IDs: CVE-2026-42151, GHSA-wg65-39gg-5wfj
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-42151 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:29 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/prometheus/prometheus 0.311.3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/prometheus/prometheus: affected >= 0.45.2, < 0.311.3; fixed in 0.311.3

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/prometheus/prometheus: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/prometheus/prometheus.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wg65-39gg-5wfj (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-wg65-39gg-5wfj lists affected ranges: Go github.com/prometheus/prometheus >=0.45.2 <0.311.3)

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