Distribution's tag deletion bypasses storage.delete.enabled configuration
CVE-2026-41888GHSA-6pjf-3r9x-m592
What to do
Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/distribution/distribution
- Affected
- <= 2.8.3
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Go github.com/distribution/distribution/v3
- Affected
- < 3.1.1
- Fixed in
- 3.1.1
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6pjf-3r9x-m592 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/distribution/distribution/v3 >=0 =0 <=2.8.3
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 6.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-41888: 0.29% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 22.10 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary Tag deletion via the DELETE /v2/<name/manifests/<tag endpoint bypasses the storage.delete.enabled: false configuration, allowing any API client to remove tags from repositories even when the operator has explicitly disabled deletion. Details When storage.delete.enabled is configured to false, digest-based manifest deletion is correctly rejected by the guard in registry/storage/linkedblobstore.go:212-215. However, tag deletion takes a separate code path that never checks this setting: In registry/handlers/manifests.go:439-453, DeleteManifest detects a tag reference, calls tagService.Untag(), returns, never consulting registry.deleteEnabled. In turn, tagStore.Untag() calls the storage driver directly to delete the tag path without checking whether deletes are enabled. PoC Using a paired down Distribution configuration that explicitly disables deletes, such as this one, stored as config.yaml: Start a local Distribution, mounting in the above configuration from the current…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-6pjf-3r9x-m592
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-41888 Advisory: Distribution's tag deletion bypasses `storage.delete.enabled` configuration IDs: CVE-2026-41888, GHSA-6pjf-3r9x-m592 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-41888 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:22 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.3) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: github.com/distribution/distribution/v3 3.1.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/distribution/distribution: affected <= 2.8.3 - Go github.com/distribution/distribution/v3: affected < 3.1.1; fixed in 3.1.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/distribution/distribution: check the installed version with your package manager. - Go github.com/distribution/distribution/v3: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/distribution/distribution, github.com/distribution/distribution/v3. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6pjf-3r9x-m592 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6pjf-3r9x-m592 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/distribution/distribution/v3 >=0 =0 <=2.8.3) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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