Nhost Vulnerable to Account Takeover via OAuth Email Verification Bypass
CVE-2026-41574GHSA-6g38-8j4p-j3pr
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/nhost/nhost 0.0.0-20260417112436-ec8dab3f2cf4), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260417112436-ec8dab3f2cf4
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260417112436-ec8dab3f2cf4
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6g38-8j4p-j3pr lists affected ranges: Go github.com/nhost/nhost >=0 <0.0.0-20260417112436-ec8dab3f2cf4
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 9.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-41574: 0.80% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 56.58 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary Nhost automatically links an incoming OAuth identity to an existing Nhost account when the email addresses match. This is only safe when the email has been verified by the OAuth provider. Nhost's controller trusts a profile.EmailVerified boolean that is set by each provider adapter. The vulnerability is that several provider adapters do not correctly populate this field they either silently drop a verified field the provider API actually returns (Discord), or they fall back to accepting unconfirmed emails and marking them as verified (Bitbucket). Two Microsoft providers (AzureAD, EntraID) derive the email from non-ownership-proving fields like the user principal name, then mark it verified. The result is that an attacker can present an email they don't own to Nhost, have the OAuth identity merged into the victim's account, and receive a full authenticated session. Root Cause In services/auth/go/controller/signinidtoken.go, providerFlowSignIn() links a new provider identity to…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-6g38-8j4p-j3pr
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-41574 Advisory: Nhost Vulnerable to Account Takeover via OAuth Email Verification Bypass IDs: CVE-2026-41574, GHSA-6g38-8j4p-j3pr Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-41574 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:22 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.3) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/nhost/nhost 0.0.0-20260417112436-ec8dab3f2cf4. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/nhost/nhost: affected < 0.0.0-20260417112436-ec8dab3f2cf4; fixed in 0.0.0-20260417112436-ec8dab3f2cf4 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/nhost/nhost: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/nhost/nhost. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6g38-8j4p-j3pr (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6g38-8j4p-j3pr lists affected ranges: Go github.com/nhost/nhost >=0 <0.0.0-20260417112436-ec8dab3f2cf4) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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