New API: Stripe Webhook Signature Bypass via Empty Secret Enables Unlimited Quota Fraud
CVE-2026-41432GHSA-xff3-5c9p-2mr4
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/QuantumNous/new-api 0.12.10), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/QuantumNous/new-api
- Affected
- < 0.12.10
- Fixed in
- 0.12.10
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xff3-5c9p-2mr4 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/QuantumNous/new-api >=0 <0.12.10
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-41432: 0.85% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 58.22 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary A critical vulnerability exists in the Stripe webhook handler that allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge webhook events and credit arbitrary quota to their account without making any payment. The vulnerability stems from three compounding flaws: 1. The Stripe webhook endpoint does not reject requests when StripeWebhookSecret is empty (the default). 2. When the HMAC secret is empty, any attacker can compute valid webhook signatures, effectively bypassing signature verification entirely. 3. The Recharge function does not validate that the order's PaymentMethod matches the callback source, enabling cross-gateway exploitation — an order created via any payment method (e.g., Epay) can be fulfilled through a forged Stripe webhook. Affected Components - controller/topupstripe.go — StripeWebhook(), sessionCompleted() - model/topup.go — Recharge(), RechargeCreem(), RechargeWaffo() - controller/topup.go — EpayNotify() - controller/topupcreem.go — CreemAdaptor.RequestPay()…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-xff3-5c9p-2mr4
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-41432 Advisory: New API: Stripe Webhook Signature Bypass via Empty Secret Enables Unlimited Quota Fraud IDs: CVE-2026-41432, GHSA-xff3-5c9p-2mr4 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-41432 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:20 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/QuantumNous/new-api 0.12.10. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/QuantumNous/new-api: affected < 0.12.10; fixed in 0.12.10 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/QuantumNous/new-api: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xff3-5c9p-2mr4 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xff3-5c9p-2mr4 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/QuantumNous/new-api >=0 <0.12.10) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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