Budibase: Authentication Bypass via Unanchored Regex in Public Endpoint Matcher — Unauthenticated Access to Protected Endpoints
CVE-2026-41428GHSA-8783-3wgf-jggf
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @budibase/backend-core
- Affected
- <= 3.35.3
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-8783-3wgf-jggf lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/backend-core >=0 <=3.35.3
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-8783-3wgf-jggf lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/backend-core >=0 <=3.35.3
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 9.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-41428: 0.45% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 38.74 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary The authenticated middleware uses unanchored regular expressions to match public (no-auth) endpoint patterns against ctx.request.url. Since ctx.request.url in Koa includes the query string, an attacker can access any protected endpoint by appending a public endpoint path as a query parameter. For example, POST /api/global/users/search?x=/api/system/status bypasses all authentication because the regex /api/system/status/ matches in the query string portion of the URL. Details Step 1 — Public endpoint patterns compiled without anchors packages/backend-core/src/middleware/matchers.ts, line 26: No ^ prefix, no $ suffix. The regex matches anywhere in the test string. Step 2 — Regex tested against full URL including query string packages/backend-core/src/middleware/matchers.ts, line 32: Koa's ctx.request.url returns the full URL including query string (e.g., /api/global/users/search?x=/api/system/status). The regex /api/system/status matches in the query string. Step 3 —…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-8783-3wgf-jggf
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-8783-3wgf-jggf
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-8783-3wgf-jggf
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-41428 Advisory: Budibase: Authentication Bypass via Unanchored Regex in Public Endpoint Matcher — Unauthenticated Access to Protected Endpoints IDs: CVE-2026-41428, GHSA-8783-3wgf-jggf Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-41428 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:51 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @budibase/backend-core: affected <= 3.35.3 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @budibase/backend-core --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @budibase/backend-core. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8783-3wgf-jggf (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-8783-3wgf-jggf lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/backend-core >=0 <=3.35.3) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-8783-3wgf-jggf (OSV record GHSA-8783-3wgf-jggf lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/backend-core >=0 <=3.35.3) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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