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Critical, CVSS 9.1

Dgraph: Pre-Auth Full Database Exfiltration via DQL Injection in NQuad Lang Field

CVE-2026-41328GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4

What to do

Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • Go github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25

    Affected
    < 25.3.3
    Fixed in
    25.3.3
  • Go github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph

    Affected
    <= 1.2.8
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded
  • Go github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v24

    Affected
    <= 24.1.8
    Fixed in
    no fixed version recorded

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
9.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-41328: 0.41% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 35.81 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

1. Executive Summary A vulnerability has been found in Dgraph that gives an unauthenticated attacker full read access to every piece of data in the database. This affects Dgraph's default configuration where ACL is not enabled. The attack requires two HTTP POSTs to port 8080. The first sets up a schema predicate with @unique @index(exact) @lang via /alter (also unauthenticated in default config). The second sends a crafted JSON mutation to /mutate?commitNow=true where a JSON key contains the predicate name followed by @ and a DQL injection payload in the language tag position. The injection exploits the addQueryIfUnique function in edgraph/server.go, which constructs DQL queries using fmt.Sprintf with unsanitized predicateName that includes the raw pred.Lang value. The Lang field is extracted from JSON mutation keys by x.PredicateLang(), which splits on @, and is never validated by any function in the codebase. The attacker injects a closing parenthesis to escape the eq() function,…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-41328

Advisory: Dgraph: Pre-Auth Full Database Exfiltration via DQL Injection in NQuad Lang Field
IDs: CVE-2026-41328, GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-41328 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:19 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25 25.3.3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25: affected < 25.3.3; fixed in 25.3.3
- Go github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph: affected <= 1.2.8
- Go github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v24: affected <= 24.1.8

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph: check the installed version with your package manager.
- Go github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v24: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25, github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph, github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v24.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25 >=0 =0 =0 <=1.2.8)

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