OpenClaw: Gateway chat.send ACP-only provenance guard could be bypassed by client identity spoofing

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

not scored

EPSS

• CVE-2026-41299: 0.20% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 10.30 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary ACP-only provenance fields in chat.send were gated by self-declared client metadata from the WebSocket handshake rather than verified authorization state. Impact A normal authenticated operator client could spoof ACP identity labels and inject reserved provenance fields intended only for the ACP bridge. Affected Component src/gateway/server-methods/chat.ts, src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts Fixed Versions - Affected: <= 2026.3.24 - Patched: = 2026.3.28 - Latest stable 2026.3.28 contains the fix. Fix Fixed by commit 4b9542716c (Gateway: require verified scope for chat provenance).

Published by the source

31 Mar 2026, 23:57 UTC

Last modified by the source

21 Apr 2026, 00:11 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 12:48 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-6xg4-82hv-cp6f

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-6xg4-82hv-cp6f

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-41299

Advisory: OpenClaw: Gateway chat.send ACP-only provenance guard could be bypassed by client identity spoofing
IDs: CVE-2026-41299, GHSA-6xg4-82hv-cp6f
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-41299 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:48 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Unrated
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: openclaw 2026.3.28. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm openclaw: affected <= 2026.3.24; fixed in 2026.3.28

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls openclaw --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on openclaw.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6xg4-82hv-cp6f (OSV record GHSA-6xg4-82hv-cp6f lists affected ranges: npm openclaw >=0 <2026.3.28 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6xg4-82hv-cp6f (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6xg4-82hv-cp6f lists affected ranges: npm openclaw >=0 <=2026.3.24)

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