Calico Inserts Sensitive Information into Log File

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

6.0 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2026-41185: 0.32% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 25.34 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

When Calico is configured with the Azure IPAM plugin, the Calico CNI binary mutates the incoming CNI configuration to attach subnet information before delegating to the IPAM plugin. After mutating, the Azure IPAM helper logs the entire unmarshaled configuration map (stdinData) at INFO level to /var/log/calico/cni/cni.log on every CNI ADD and DEL invocation — once per pod scheduled or terminated on the node. When the cluster is deployed using token-based Kubernetes authentication, this log entry contains the ServiceAccount token, client key, and certificate authority in plaintext. Any principal with read access to /var/log/calico/cni/cni.log on a node can read these logs and extract the credentials, which grant cluster-wide Calico networking admin privileges.

Published by the source

28 May 2026, 18:30 UTC

Last modified by the source

2 Jul 2026, 17:30 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:24 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-m67g-87rx-v42c

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-41185

Advisory: Calico Inserts Sensitive Information into Log File
IDs: CVE-2026-41185, GHSA-m67g-87rx-v42c
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-41185 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:24 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.0)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/projectcalico/calico 3.31.6, 1.11.0-cni-plugin.0.20260417001138-cd73bc2cea0f. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/projectcalico/calico: affected >= 2.0.0, < 3.31.6; < 1.11.0-cni-plugin.0.20260417001138-cd73bc2cea0f; fixed in 1.11.0-cni-plugin.0.20260417001138-cd73bc2cea0f, 3.31.6

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/projectcalico/calico: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/projectcalico/calico.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m67g-87rx-v42c (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-m67g-87rx-v42c lists affected ranges: Go github.com/projectcalico/calico >=2.0.0 =0 <1.11.0-cni-plugin.0.20260417001138-cd73bc2cea0f)

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