goshs's public collaborator feed leaks .goshs ACL credentials and enables unauthorized access
CVE-2026-40885GHSA-7h3j-592v-jcrp
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2 2.0.0-beta.6), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2
- Affected
- >= 2.0.0-beta.4, <= 2.0.0-beta.5
- Fixed in
- 2.0.0-beta.6
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7h3j-592v-jcrp lists affected ranges: Go github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2 >=2.0.0-beta.4 <=2.0.0-beta.5
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 7.7 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-40885: 0.31% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 24.02 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary goshs leaks file-based ACL credentials through its public collaborator feed when the server is deployed without global basic auth. Requests to .goshs-protected folders are logged before authorization is enforced, and the collaborator websocket broadcasts raw request headers, including Authorization. An unauthenticated observer can capture a victim's folder-specific basic-auth header and replay it to read, upload, overwrite, and delete files inside the protected subtree. I reproduced this on v2.0.0-beta.5, the latest supported release as of April 10, 2026. Details The main web UI and collaborator websocket stay public when goshs is started without global -b user:pass authentication: - httpserver/server.go:72-85 only installs BasicAuthMiddleware() when a global username or password is configured The vulnerable request is logged before .goshs authorization is enforced: - httpserver/handler.go:277-279 calls emitCollabEvent() and logger.LogRequest() before the protected file is…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-7h3j-592v-jcrp
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-40885 Advisory: goshs's public collaborator feed leaks .goshs ACL credentials and enables unauthorized access IDs: CVE-2026-40885, GHSA-7h3j-592v-jcrp Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-40885 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:19 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.7) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2 2.0.0-beta.6. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2: affected >= 2.0.0-beta.4, <= 2.0.0-beta.5; fixed in 2.0.0-beta.6 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7h3j-592v-jcrp (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7h3j-592v-jcrp lists affected ranges: Go github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2 >=2.0.0-beta.4 <=2.0.0-beta.5) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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