Cosign's verify-blob-attestation reports false positive when payload parsing fails
CVE-2026-39395GHSA-w6c6-c85g-mmv6
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/sigstore/cosign 3.0.6, 2.6.3), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
- Affected
- >= 3.0.0, < 3.0.6< 2.6.3
- Fixed in
- 3.0.6, 2.6.3
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-w6c6-c85g-mmv6 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/sigstore/cosign >=3.0.0 =0 <2.6.3
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 4.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-39395: 0.24% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 15.27 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Description cosign verify-blob-attestation may erroneously report a "Verified OK" result for attestations with malformed payloads or mismatched predicate types. For old-format bundles and detached signatures, this was due to a logic flaw in the error handling of the predicate type validation. For new-format bundles, the predicate type validation was bypassed completely. Impact When cosign verify-blob-attestation is used without --check-claims set to true, an attestation that has a valid signature but a malformed or unparsable payload would be incorrectly validated. Additionally, systems relying on --type <predicate type to reject attestations with mismatched types would be lead to trust the unexpected attestation type. Patches v3.0.6, v2.6.3 Workarounds Always set --check-claims=true for attestation verification.
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-w6c6-c85g-mmv6
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-39395 Advisory: Cosign's verify-blob-attestation reports false positive when payload parsing fails IDs: CVE-2026-39395, GHSA-w6c6-c85g-mmv6 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-39395 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:19 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 4.3) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/sigstore/cosign 3.0.6, 2.6.3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/sigstore/cosign: affected >= 3.0.0, < 3.0.6; < 2.6.3; fixed in 3.0.6, 2.6.3 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/sigstore/cosign: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/sigstore/cosign. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w6c6-c85g-mmv6 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-w6c6-c85g-mmv6 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/sigstore/cosign >=3.0.0 =0 <2.6.3) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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