Budibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

7.1 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2026-35219: 0.46% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 40.31 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using node-fetch directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when BLACKLISTIPS is not configured. Vulnerable Code Automation Steps (No Blacklist) All automation steps use fetch() directly without any IP validation: packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts line 69: packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts line 34: packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts line 53: packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts line 20: packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts line 29: REST API Integration (Empty Default Blacklist) packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts line 684: But BLACKLISTIPS env var defaults to undefined, so the blacklist is empty: packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts lines…

Published by the source

14 Aug 2026, 19:18 UTC

Last modified by the source

14 Aug 2026, 19:18 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:01 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-35219

Advisory: Budibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist
IDs: CVE-2026-35219, GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-35219 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:01 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @budibase/server 3.41.3. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm @budibase/server: affected < 3.41.3; fixed in 3.41.3

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls @budibase/server --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on @budibase/server.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7 lists affected ranges: npm @budibase/server >=0 <3.41.3)

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