MinIO is Vulnerable to SSE Metadata Injection via Replication Headers
CVE-2026-34204GHSA-3rh2-v3gr-35p9
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/minio/minio
- Affected
- >= 0.0.0-20240328174456-468a9fae83e9, <= 0.0.0-20260212201848-7aac2a2c5b7c
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-3rh2-v3gr-35p9 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/minio/minio >=0.0.0-20240328174456-468a9fae83e9 <=0.0.0-20260212201848-7aac2a2c5b7c
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 7.1 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-34204: 0.13% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 2.54 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Impact What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? A flaw in extractMetadataFromMime() allows any authenticated user with s3:PutObject permission to inject internal server-side encryption metadata into objects by sending crafted X-Minio-Replication- headers on a normal PutObject request. The server unconditionally maps these headers to X-Minio-Internal- encryption metadata without verifying that the request is a legitimate replication request. Objects written this way carry bogus encryption keys and become permanently unreadable through the S3 API. Any authenticated user or service with s3:PutObject permission on any bucket can make objects permanently unreadable by injecting fake SSE encryption metadata. The attacker sends a standard PutObject request with X-Minio-Replication-Server-Side-Encryption- headers but without the X-Minio-Source-Replication-Request header that marks legitimate replication traffic. The server maps these headers to internal encryption metadata…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-3rh2-v3gr-35p9
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-34204 Advisory: MinIO is Vulnerable to SSE Metadata Injection via Replication Headers IDs: CVE-2026-34204, GHSA-3rh2-v3gr-35p9 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-34204 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:19 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.1) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/minio/minio: affected >= 0.0.0-20240328174456-468a9fae83e9, <= 0.0.0-20260212201848-7aac2a2c5b7c ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/minio/minio: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/minio/minio. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3rh2-v3gr-35p9 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-3rh2-v3gr-35p9 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/minio/minio >=0.0.0-20240328174456-468a9fae83e9 <=0.0.0-20260212201848-7aac2a2c5b7c) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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