nimiq-consensus panics via RequestMacroChain micro-block locator

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

EPSS

• CVE-2026-34069: 0.30% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 22.40 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact An unauthenticated p2p peer can cause the RequestMacroChain message handler task to panic by sending a RequestMacroChain message where the first locator hash that is on the victim’s main chain is a micro block hash (not a macro block hash). In RequestMacroChain::handle, the handler selects the locator based only on "is on main chain", then calls getmacroblocks() and panics via .unwrap() when the selected hash is not a macro block (BlockchainError::BlockIsNotMacro). Patches The patch for this vulnerability](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3660) is formally released as part of v1.3.0. Workarounds No known workarounds.

Published by the source

13 Apr 2026, 16:36 UTC

Last modified by the source

15 Apr 2026, 20:56 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-48m6-486p-9j8p

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-34069

Advisory: nimiq-consensus panics via RequestMacroChain micro-block locator
IDs: CVE-2026-34069, GHSA-48m6-486p-9j8p
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-34069 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io nimiq-consensus: affected <= 1.2.2

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io nimiq-consensus: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on nimiq-consensus.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-48m6-486p-9j8p (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-48m6-486p-9j8p lists affected ranges: crates.io nimiq-consensus >=0 <=1.2.2)

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