AVideo has an Authorize.Net Webhook Signature Bypass that Enables Wallet Balance Inflation via Forged Payment Data
CVE-2026-33731GHSA-95jh-7r58-xmxw
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (wwbn/avideo 29.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Packagist wwbn/avideo
- Affected
- <= 28.0
- Fixed in
- 29.0
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-95jh-7r58-xmxw lists affected ranges: Packagist wwbn/avideo >=0 <=28.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 6.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-33731: 0.16% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 5.57 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary The Authorize.Net webhook handler at plugin/AuthorizeNet/webhook.php contains a signature verification bypass that allows an attacker to forge webhook requests with arbitrary payment amounts and target user IDs. By supplying a valid transaction ID from a small legitimate purchase, the attacker bypasses signature validation and credits arbitrary wallet balances to any user account via attacker-controlled payload fields. Details Three flaws combine into an exploit chain: 1. Signature Bypass via OR Logic (webhook.php:33) The webhook is rejected only when both conditions are true: the signature is invalid AND the transaction lookup fails. If the attacker supplies a real transaction ID (e.g., from their own $1 purchase), getTransactionDetails() succeeds and returns valid data, so the second condition is false. The invalid signature is silently ignored. 2. Payload Values Override API-Fetched Values (AuthorizeNet.php:169-171, webhook.php:44-48) In analyzeTransactionFromWebhook(),…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-95jh-7r58-xmxw
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-33731 Advisory: AVideo has an Authorize.Net Webhook Signature Bypass that Enables Wallet Balance Inflation via Forged Payment Data IDs: CVE-2026-33731, GHSA-95jh-7r58-xmxw Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-33731 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:49 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: wwbn/avideo 29.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Packagist wwbn/avideo: affected <= 28.0; fixed in 29.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Packagist wwbn/avideo: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on wwbn/avideo. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-95jh-7r58-xmxw (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-95jh-7r58-xmxw lists affected ranges: Packagist wwbn/avideo >=0 <=28.0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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