LMDeploy has Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Vision-Language Image Loading
CVE-2026-33626GHSA-6w67-hwm5-92mq
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
PyPI lmdeploy
- Affected
- <= 0.12.2
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-6w67-hwm5-92mq lists affected ranges: PyPI lmdeploy >=0 <=0.12.2
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6w67-hwm5-92mq lists affected ranges: PyPI lmdeploy >=0 <=0.12.2
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-33626: 45.25% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 98.79 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in LMDeploy's vision-language module. The loadimage() function in lmdeploy/vl/utils.py fetches arbitrary URLs without validating internal/private IP addresses, allowing attackers to access cloud metadata services, internal networks, and sensitive resources. Affected Versions - Tested on: main branch (2026-02-04) - Affected: All versions prior to 0.12.3 Vulnerable Code File: lmdeploy/vl/utils.py (lines 64-67) Also affected: encodeimagebase64() function (lines 26-29) Root Cause 1. No validation of URLs before fetching 2. No blocklist for internal IPs (127.0.0.1, 169.254.x.x, 10.x.x.x, 192.168.x.x) 3. Server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default (apiserver.py line 1393) 4. API keys disabled by default Attack Scenario 1. LMDeploy server deployed with vision-language model 2. Attacker sends request to /v1/chat/completions with malicious imageurl: 3. Server fetches URL without validation 4. Attacker receives cloud credentials Proof of…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-6w67-hwm5-92mq
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-6w67-hwm5-92mq
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-33626 Advisory: LMDeploy has Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Vision-Language Image Loading IDs: CVE-2026-33626, GHSA-6w67-hwm5-92mq Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-33626 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:54 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.5) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - PyPI lmdeploy: affected <= 0.12.2 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `python -m pip show lmdeploy`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on lmdeploy. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6w67-hwm5-92mq (OSV record GHSA-6w67-hwm5-92mq lists affected ranges: PyPI lmdeploy >=0 <=0.12.2) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6w67-hwm5-92mq (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6w67-hwm5-92mq lists affected ranges: PyPI lmdeploy >=0 <=0.12.2) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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