AVideo has an authenticated arbitrary local file read via chunkFile path injection in aVideoEncoder.json.php
CVE-2026-33354GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6
What to do
Vendor response not established. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Packagist wwbn/avideo
- Affected
- <= 26.0
- Fixed in
- no fixed version recorded
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6 lists affected ranges: Packagist wwbn/avideo >=0 <=26.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.6 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-33354: 0.26% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 17.62 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary POST /objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php accepts a requester-controlled chunkFile parameter intended for staged upload chunks. Instead of restricting that path to trusted server-generated chunk locations, the endpoint accepts arbitrary local filesystem paths that pass isValidURLOrPath(). That helper allows files under broad server directories including /var/www/, the application root, cache, tmp, and videos, only rejecting .php files. For an authenticated uploader editing their own video, this becomes an arbitrary local file read. The endpoint copies the attacker-chosen local file into the attacker's public video storage path, after which it can be downloaded over HTTP. I confirmed this locally by creating an attacker-owned video, then calling aVideoEncoder.json.php with videosid=<own video, format=mp4, and chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem. The resulting public video URL returned the local TLS private key and began with -----BEGIN…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-33354 Advisory: AVideo has an authenticated arbitrary local file read via `chunkFile` path injection in `aVideoEncoder.json.php` IDs: CVE-2026-33354, GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-33354 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:39 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.6) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor response not established. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Packagist wwbn/avideo: affected <= 26.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Packagist wwbn/avideo: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on wwbn/avideo. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6 lists affected ranges: Packagist wwbn/avideo >=0 <=26.0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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