bcrypt-ruby has an Integer Overflow that Causes Zero Key-Strengthening Iterations at Cost=31 on JRuby
CVE-2026-33306GHSA-f27w-vcwj-c954
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (bcrypt 3.1.22), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
RubyGems bcrypt
- Affected
- <= 3.1.21
- Fixed in
- 3.1.22
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-f27w-vcwj-c954 lists affected ranges: RubyGems bcrypt >=0 <=3.1.21
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 4.5 · CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U · score source
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-33306: 0.24% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 14.83 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Impact An integer overflow in the Java BCrypt implementation for JRuby can cause zero iterations in the strengthening loop. Impacted applications must be setting the cost to 31 to see this happen. The JRuby implementation of bcrypt-ruby (BCrypt.java) computes the key-strengthening round count as a signed 32-bit integer. When cost=31 (the maximum allowed by the gem), signed integer overflow causes the round count to become negative, and the strengthening loop executes zero iterations. This collapses bcrypt from 2^31 rounds of exponential key-strengthening to effectively constant-time computation — only the initial EksBlowfish key setup and final 64x encryption phase remain. The resulting hash looks valid ($2a$31$...) and verifies correctly via checkpw, making the weakness invisible to the application. This issue is triggered only when cost=31 is used or when verifying a $2a$31$ hash. Patches This problem has been fixed in version 3.1.22 Workarounds Set the cost to something less than…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-f27w-vcwj-c954
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-33306 Advisory: bcrypt-ruby has an Integer Overflow that Causes Zero Key-Strengthening Iterations at Cost=31 on JRuby IDs: CVE-2026-33306, GHSA-f27w-vcwj-c954 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-33306 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:51 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 4.5) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: bcrypt 3.1.22. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - RubyGems bcrypt: affected <= 3.1.21; fixed in 3.1.22 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - RubyGems bcrypt: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on bcrypt. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f27w-vcwj-c954 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-f27w-vcwj-c954 lists affected ranges: RubyGems bcrypt >=0 <=3.1.21) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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