Allure Report has an Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in Attachment Processing (Allure 1, Allure 2, and XCTest Readers)

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

8.6 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-33166: 0.55% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 45.97 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The Allure report generator is vulnerable to an arbitrary file read via path traversal when processing test results. An attacker can craft a malicious result file (-result.json, -container.json, or .plist) that points an attachment source to a sensitive file on the host system. During report generation, Allure will resolve these paths and include the sensitive files in the final report. Details The vulnerability exists in several plugins where attachment paths are resolved using unvalidated user input. The code uses Path.resolve() without normalizing the path or checking if the resulting file remains within the intended results directory. Affected Files and Lines: Allure2Plugin.java (Line 264): final Path attachmentFile = source.resolve(attachment.getSource()); Allure1Plugin.java (Line 328): final Path attachmentFile = source.resolve(attachment.getSource()); XcTestPlugin.java (Line 181): attachments.resolve(String.format("Screenshot%s.%s", uuid, ext)) Since resolve() allows…

Published by the source

18 Mar 2026, 19:53 UTC

Last modified by the source

25 Mar 2026, 18:11 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 16:44 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-33166

Advisory: Allure Report has an Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in Attachment Processing (Allure 1, Allure 2, and XCTest Readers)
IDs: CVE-2026-33166, GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-33166 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 16:44 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.6)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: io.qameta.allure:allure-generator 2.38.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Maven io.qameta.allure:allure-generator: affected <= 2.37.0; fixed in 2.38.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Maven io.qameta.allure:allure-generator: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on io.qameta.allure:allure-generator.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw lists affected ranges: Maven io.qameta.allure:allure-generator >=0 <=2.37.0)

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