IncusOS has a LUKS encryption bypass due to insufficient TPM policy
CVE-2026-32606GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/lxc/incus-os/incus-osd 0.0.0-20260313012803-e3b35f230d23), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Go github.com/lxc/incus-os/incus-osd
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260313012803-e3b35f230d23
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260313012803-e3b35f230d23
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc lists affected ranges: Go github.com/lxc/incus-os/incus-osd >=0 <0.0.0-20260313012803-e3b35f230d23
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 7.6 · CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-32606: 0.15% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 3.82 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
The default configuration of systemd-cryptenroll as used by IncusOS through mkosi allows for an attacker with physical access to the machine to access the encrypted data without requiring any interaction by the system's owner or any tampering of Secure Boot state or kernel (UKI) boot image. That's because in this configuration, the LUKS key is made available by the TPM so long as the system has the expected PCR7 value and the PCR11 policy matches. That default PCR11 policy importantly allows for the TPM to release the key to the booted system rather than just from the initrd part of the signed kernel image (UKI). The attack relies on the attacker being able to substitute the original encrypted root partition for one that they control. By doing so, the system will prompt for a recovery key on boot, which the attacker has defined and can provide, before booting the system using the attacker's root partition rather than the system's original one. The attacker only needs to put a systemd…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-32606 Advisory: IncusOS has a LUKS encryption bypass due to insufficient TPM policy IDs: CVE-2026-32606, GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-32606 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:18 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: High (CVSS 7.6) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/lxc/incus-os/incus-osd 0.0.0-20260313012803-e3b35f230d23. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/lxc/incus-os/incus-osd: affected < 0.0.0-20260313012803-e3b35f230d23; fixed in 0.0.0-20260313012803-e3b35f230d23 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/lxc/incus-os/incus-osd: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/lxc/incus-os/incus-osd. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-wj2j-qwcf-cfcc lists affected ranges: Go github.com/lxc/incus-os/incus-osd >=0 <0.0.0-20260313012803-e3b35f230d23) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
Loading voting…