ZeptoClaw: Generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields; allowlist is checked against untrusted payload data

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

8.2 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-32231: 0.19% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 8.87 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields (sender, chatid) from the request body and applies authorization checks to those untrusted values. Because authentication is optional and defaults to disabled (authtoken: None), an attacker who can reach POST /webhook can spoof an allowlisted sender and choose arbitrary chatid values, enabling high-risk message spoofing and potential IDOR-style session/chat routing abuse. Details Relevant code paths: - src/channels/webhook.rs:121 sets runtime default authtoken: None. - src/config/types.rs:910 also defaults webhook config authtoken to None. - src/channels/webhook.rs:224 (validateauth) explicitly allows requests when no token is configured. - src/channels/webhook.rs:128 defines WebhookPayload with identity fields fully controlled by caller input: - sender: String - chatid: String - src/channels/webhook.rs:421 performs allowlist authorization using payload.sender. - src/channels/webhook.rs:433 and…

Published by the source

12 Mar 2026, 16:36 UTC

Last modified by the source

13 Mar 2026, 13:35 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-32231

Advisory: ZeptoClaw: Generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields; allowlist is checked against untrusted payload data
IDs: CVE-2026-32231, GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-32231 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:42 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.2)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: zeptoclaw 0.7.6. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io zeptoclaw: affected <= 0.7.5; fixed in 0.7.6

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io zeptoclaw: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on zeptoclaw.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c lists affected ranges: crates.io zeptoclaw >=0 <=0.7.5)

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.