OpenClaw has a sandbox network isolation bypass via docker.network=container:
CVE-2026-32038GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (openclaw 2026.2.24), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm openclaw
- Affected
- <= 2026.2.23
- Fixed in
- 2026.2.24
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9 lists affected ranges: npm openclaw >=0 <2026.2.24 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9 lists affected ranges: npm openclaw >=0 <=2026.2.23
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 6.9 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-32038: 0.27% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 19.25 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary In openclaw@2026.2.23, sandbox network hardening blocks network=host but still allows network=container:<id. This can let a sandbox join another container's network namespace and reach services available in that namespace. Preconditions and Trust Model Context This issue requires a trusted-operator configuration path (for example setting agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network in gateway config). It is not an unauthenticated remote exploit by itself. Details Current validation blocks only host, while forwarding other values to Docker create args: - validateNetworkMode(network) only rejects values in BLOCKEDNETWORKMODES = {"host"}. - buildSandboxCreateArgs(...) validates then forwards cfg.network into --network. - Browser sandbox helper also treats container: as an accepted mode in network preparation. Effective behavior: - host - blocked - container:<id - accepted and forwarded Impact Type: sandbox network isolation hardening bypass. Practical impact depends on deployment: -…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-32038 Advisory: OpenClaw has a sandbox network isolation bypass via docker.network=container: IDs: CVE-2026-32038, GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-32038 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:46 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.9) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: openclaw 2026.2.24. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm openclaw: affected <= 2026.2.23; fixed in 2026.2.24 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls openclaw --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on openclaw. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9 (OSV record GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9 lists affected ranges: npm openclaw >=0 <2026.2.24 (fixed)) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9 lists affected ranges: npm openclaw >=0 <=2026.2.23) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
Loading voting…