StudioCMS has Privilege Escalation via Insecure API Token Generation

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

8.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS

• CVE-2026-30944: 0.59% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 48.08 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The /studiocmsapi/dashboard/api-tokens endpoint allows any authenticated user (at least Editor) to generate API tokens for any other user, including owner and admin accounts. The endpoint fails to validate whether the requesting user is authorized to create tokens on behalf of the target user ID, resulting in a full privilege escalation. Details The API token generation endpoint accepts a user parameter in the request body that specifies which user the token should be created for. The server-side logic authenticates the session (via authsession cookie) but does not verify that the authenticated user matches the target user ID nor checks if the caller has sufficient privileges to perform this action on behalf of another user. This is a classic BOLA vulnerability: the authorization check is limited to "is the user logged in?" instead of "is this user authorized to perform this action on this specific resource?" Vulnerable Code The following is the server-side handler for the…

Published by the source

10 Mar 2026, 18:16 UTC

Last modified by the source

10 Mar 2026, 19:01 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 12:43 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-667w-mmh7-mrr4

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-667w-mmh7-mrr4

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-30944

Advisory: StudioCMS has Privilege Escalation via Insecure API Token Generation
IDs: CVE-2026-30944, GHSA-667w-mmh7-mrr4
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-30944 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 12:43 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.8)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: studiocms 0.4.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm studiocms: affected <= 0.3.0; fixed in 0.4.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls studiocms --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on studiocms.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-667w-mmh7-mrr4 (OSV record GHSA-667w-mmh7-mrr4 lists affected ranges: npm studiocms >=0 <0.4.0 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-667w-mmh7-mrr4 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-667w-mmh7-mrr4 lists affected ranges: npm studiocms >=0 <=0.3.0)

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