A Fleet team maintainer can transfer hosts from any team via missing source team authorization

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

4.9 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2026-29180: 0.33% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 25.91 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary A broken access control vulnerability in Fleet's host transfer API allows a team maintainer to transfer hosts from any team into their own team, bypassing team isolation boundaries. Once transferred, the attacker gains full control over the stolen hosts, including the ability to execute scripts with root privileges. Impact The host transfer endpoints verify that the caller has write permission to the destination team but do not check whether the caller has any permission over the source team of the hosts being transferred. Once hosts are transferred, the attacker's team MDM configuration is automatically applied to the stolen devices, and the attacker can execute scripts on them with root privileges. In multi-tenant Fleet deployments where teams represent business units, departments, or customers, this breaks all team isolation guarantees. A bulk transfer variant allows stealing all matching hosts fleet-wide in a single request. Exploitation requires authentication as a team…

Published by the source

27 Mar 2026, 20:24 UTC

Last modified by the source

30 Mar 2026, 11:31 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:19 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-m2h6-4xpq-qw3m

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-29180

Advisory: A Fleet team maintainer can transfer hosts from any team via missing source team authorization
IDs: CVE-2026-29180, GHSA-m2h6-4xpq-qw3m
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-29180 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:19 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 4.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 4.81.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4: affected < 4.81.1; fixed in 4.81.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-4xpq-qw3m (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-m2h6-4xpq-qw3m lists affected ranges: Go github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 >=0 <4.81.1)

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