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Critical, CVSS 9.4amended

Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine Oracle JSON Path via DID Search API

CVE-2026-29080GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (rucio 40.1.1, 39.4.2, 38.5.5, 35.8.5), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • PyPI rucio

    Affected
    >= 1.27.0, < 35.8.5>= 36.0.0, < 38.5.5>= 39.0.0, < 39.4.2>= 40.0.0, < 40.1.1
    Fixed in
    35.8.5, 40.1.1, 39.4.2, 38.5.5

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS 4.0
9.4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X · score source
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-29080: 0.28% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 20.66 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary A SQL injection vulnerability in the Oracle path of FilterEngine.createsqlaquery allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (GET /dids/<scope/dids/search). Attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into sqlalchemy.text via Python str.format, completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. The vulnerability is affecting deployments using the default metadata plugin configuration jsonmeta with Oracle database backends. --- Details The vulnerability exists in lib/rucio/core/didmetaplugins/filterengine.py within the createsqlaquery() method. When the database dialect is Oracle, filter expressions for JSON metadata columns are constructed using text() with Python string formatting: filterengine.py:552 (string equality — default branch):…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 4 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3

  2. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.

  3. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3

  4. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-29080

Advisory: Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine Oracle JSON Path via DID Search API
IDs: CVE-2026-29080, GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-29080 (revision 4, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:46 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.4)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: rucio 40.1.1, 39.4.2, 38.5.5, 35.8.5. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI rucio: affected >= 1.27.0, < 35.8.5; >= 36.0.0, < 38.5.5; >= 39.0.0, < 39.4.2; >= 40.0.0, < 40.1.1; fixed in 35.8.5, 40.1.1, 39.4.2, 38.5.5

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show rucio`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on rucio.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3 lists affected ranges: PyPI rucio >=1.27.0 =36.0.0 =39.0.0 =40.0.0 <40.1.1)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3 (OSV record GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3 lists affected ranges: PyPI rucio >=1.27.0 =36.0.0 =39.0.0 =40.0.0 <40.1.1 (fixed))

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