Modoboa has OS Command Injection

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.2 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS

• CVE-2026-27602: 0.58% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 47.54 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary execcmd() in modoboa/lib/sysutils.py always runs subprocess calls with shell=True. Since domain names flow directly into shell command strings without any sanitization, a Reseller or SuperAdmin can include shell metacharacters in a domain name to run arbitrary OS commands on the server. Details The root cause is in modoboa/lib/sysutils.py:31: When a create a domain is created with DKIM enabled, the domain name gets embedded into a shell command like this: If the domain name contains something like $(id/tmp/proof).example.com, the shell executes the injected command before running openssl. The same pattern appears in several other places: - modoboa/admin/jobs.py:38 — mailbox rename via mv using fulladdress - modoboa/amavis/lib.py:202 — sa-learn using domain.name - modoboa/admin/models/mailbox.py:150 — doveadm user using fulladdress - modoboa/maillog/graphics.py:105–107 — rrdtool using domain.name - modoboa/webmail/models.py:54–57 — doveadm move/delete using account.email PoC…

Published by the source

25 Mar 2026, 17:03 UTC

Last modified by the source

13 Jul 2026, 07:26 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 13:40 UTC

1. Revision 2 · amended · 26 Oct 2026

   Amended from ghsa record GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m

2. Revision 1 · created · 24 Oct 2026

   Published from osv record GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-27602

Advisory: Modoboa has OS Command Injection
IDs: CVE-2026-27602, GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-27602 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:40 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.2)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: modoboa 2.7.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI modoboa: affected <= 2.7.0; fixed in 2.7.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show modoboa`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on modoboa.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m (OSV record GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m lists affected ranges: PyPI modoboa >=0 <2.7.1 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m lists affected ranges: PyPI modoboa >=0 <=2.7.0)

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.