Magento's X-Original-Url header can expose admin url

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

5.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-25523: 0.32% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 25.37 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact The admin url can be discovered without prior knowledge of it's location by exploiting the X-Original-Url header on some configurations. Patches The bug comes from the Zend library and is patche by unsetting the header in the bootstrap process. Workarounds Unset the X-Original-Url header in the web server configuration. References The activation of these headers is coming from the ZendController module. It appears this has been known to some degree since 2016 - https://peterocallaghan.co.uk/2016/12/magento-poisoning-cache/ (dead link now..) Credit Anees Hyder ( @anees0xdev ) via HackerOne https://hackerone.com/anees0xdev/hacktivity

Published by the source

2 Feb 2026, 23:12 UTC

Last modified by the source

12 Feb 2026, 13:38 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 14:38 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-jg68-vhv3-9r8f

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-25523

Advisory: Magento's X-Original-Url header can expose admin url
IDs: CVE-2026-25523, GHSA-jg68-vhv3-9r8f
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-25523 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 14:38 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: openmage/magento-lts 20.16.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Packagist openmage/magento-lts: affected < 20.16.1; fixed in 20.16.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Packagist openmage/magento-lts: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on openmage/magento-lts.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jg68-vhv3-9r8f (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-jg68-vhv3-9r8f lists affected ranges: Packagist openmage/magento-lts >=0 <20.16.1)

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