RustFS's RPC signature verification logs shared secret

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS 4.0

2.9 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P · score source

EPSS

• CVE-2026-22782: 0.52% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 44.51 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary Invalid RPC signatures cause the server to log the shared HMAC secret (and expected signature), which exposes the secret to log readers and enables forged RPC calls. Details In crates/ecstore/src/rpc/httpauth.rs:115-122 , the invalid signature branch logs sensitive data: This log line includes secret and expectedsignature, both derived from the shared HMAC key. Any invalidly signed request triggers this path. The function is reachable from RPC and admin request handlers. PoC 1. Run RustFS with error logging enabled. 1. Send a request with an invalid signature: 1. Observed output: Impact - Exposes the shared RPC HMAC secret to log readers. - Enables attackers with log access to forge valid RPC signatures and make unauthorized RPC calls.

Published by the source

16 Jan 2026, 15:48 UTC

Last modified by the source

16 Jan 2026, 19:11 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:39 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-333v-68xh-8mmq

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-22782

Advisory: RustFS's RPC signature verification logs shared secret
IDs: CVE-2026-22782, GHSA-333v-68xh-8mmq
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-22782 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:39 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Low (CVSS 2.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: rustfs 1.0.0-alpha.80. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io rustfs: affected >= 1.0.0-alpha.1, <= 1.0.0-alpha.79; fixed in 1.0.0-alpha.80

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io rustfs: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on rustfs.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-333v-68xh-8mmq (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-333v-68xh-8mmq lists affected ranges: crates.io rustfs >=1.0.0-alpha.1 <=1.0.0-alpha.79)

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