Sealed Secrets for Kubernetes: Rotate API Allows Scope Widening from Strict/Namespace-Wide to Cluster-Wide via Untrusted Template Annotations

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

4.9 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

EPSS

• CVE-2026-22728: 0.41% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 35.16 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

This report shows a scope-widening issue in the rotate (re-encrypt) flow: the output scope can be derived from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations on the input sealed secret. If a victim sealed secret is strict- or namespace-scoped, an attacker who can submit it to the rotate endpoint can set sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true in the template metadata and receive a rotated sealed secret that is cluster-wide, enabling retargeting (metadata.name/metadata.namespace) and unsealing to recover the victim plaintext. Relevant Links (Pinned) - Rotate handler uses NewSealedSecret(..., secret) after unsealing: https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/controller/controller.go#L560-L606 - Scope derivation reads secret annotations (SecretScope): https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecretexpansion.go#L112-L122 Root Cause The rotate…

Published by the source

26 Feb 2026, 22:49 UTC

Last modified by the source

26 Feb 2026, 22:49 UTC

Source last checked

26 Oct 2026, 15:14 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 26 Oct 2026

   Published from ghsa record GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-22728

Advisory: Sealed Secrets for Kubernetes: Rotate API Allows Scope Widening from Strict/Namespace-Wide to Cluster-Wide via Untrusted Template Annotations
IDs: CVE-2026-22728, GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-22728 (revision 1, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:14 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 4.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets 0.36.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets: affected < 0.36.0; fixed in 0.36.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj lists affected ranges: Go github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets >=0 <0.36.0)

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