Skip to content
Patch Next
Sign inAdd to your agent

← Actionable
High, CVSS 8.7amended

Bouncy Castle: Zeroisation of sensitive key material on garbage collection relies on finalization.

CVE-2026-13505GHSA-98j2-6v39-78w8

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (org.bouncycastle:bc-fips 2.1.3, 2.0.2, 1.0.2.7), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Add to your agent

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS 4.0
8.7 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber · score source
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-13505: 0.43% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 37.10 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

In Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bc-fips 1.0.2.7 (1.0.X series), 2.0.2 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.3 (2.1.X series), sensitive key material held by the AES and DESede engines, the SP 800-90A DRBGs, SymmetricSecretKey and the PBKD and scrypt parameter classes was zeroised on garbage collection by overriding Object.finalize. Finalization runs at an unspecified time and in an unspecified order and is serviced by a single finalizer thread, so where objects carrying a finalizer are allocated faster than that thread retires them the pending-finalization queue grows without bound: disposal falls arbitrarily far behind, which can contribute to an OutOfMemoryError under load, and the key material those objects hold stays resident in the heap for as long as they are queued, defeating the purpose of the zeroisation. The behaviour was not a problem on Java 8 or Java 11; it is later JVMs, on which finalization has been deprecated and progressively de-emphasised, where it becomes one.…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-98j2-6v39-78w8

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-98j2-6v39-78w8

Agent brief

Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.

# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-13505

Advisory: Bouncy Castle: Zeroisation of sensitive key material on garbage collection relies on finalization.
IDs: CVE-2026-13505, GHSA-98j2-6v39-78w8
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-13505 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 16:55 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.7)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: org.bouncycastle:bc-fips 2.1.3, 2.0.2, 1.0.2.7. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Maven org.bouncycastle:bc-fips: affected < 1.0.2.7; >= 2.0.0, < 2.0.2; >= 2.1.0, < 2.1.3; fixed in 2.1.3, 2.0.2, 1.0.2.7

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Maven org.bouncycastle:bc-fips: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on org.bouncycastle:bc-fips.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-98j2-6v39-78w8 (OSV record GHSA-98j2-6v39-78w8 lists affected ranges: Maven org.bouncycastle:bc-fips >=0 =2.0.0 =2.1.0 <2.1.3 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-98j2-6v39-78w8 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-98j2-6v39-78w8 lists affected ranges: Maven org.bouncycastle:bc-fips >=0 =2.0.0 =2.1.0 <2.1.3)

Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.

Loading voting…