Active Storage: Possible circumvention of file size limits in Active Storage direct uploads to Google Cloud Storage
CVE-2026-126085GHSA-hfr4-8rjc-97m2
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (activestorage 8.1.4.1, 8.0.5.2), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
RubyGems activestorage
- Affected
- >= 8.1.0.beta1, < 8.1.4.1< 8.0.5.2
- Fixed in
- 8.0.5.2, 8.1.4.1
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-hfr4-8rjc-97m2 lists affected ranges: RubyGems activestorage >=8.1.0.beta1 =0 <8.0.5.2
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-hfr4-8rjc-97m2 lists affected ranges: RubyGems activestorage >=8.1.0.beta1 =0 <8.0.5.2 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 5.3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Impact `ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService#url_for_direct_upload` does not bind the declared content length into the signed direct-upload URL, and `#headers_for_direct_upload` returns no length constraint, so the URL authorizes an upload body of any size. A direct-upload client could store a file larger than the `byte_size` it declared, and the resulting blob keeps the declared size, possibly bypassing application file size validations and quotas. This is the weakness that CVE-2020-8162 fixed in the S3 service. Applications that store files in Google Cloud Storage and accept direct uploads are affected.
Details The fixed releases sign an `x-goog-content-length-range` header that matches the blob's declared `byte_size` and return it from `headers_for_direct_upload`, so Cloud Storage rejects an upload body of any other size. Browsers send this header with the direct upload, so a bucket's CORS configuration must list `x-goog-content-length-range` in `responseHeader`, or browser…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-hfr4-8rjc-97m2
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-hfr4-8rjc-97m2
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-126085 Advisory: Active Storage: Possible circumvention of file size limits in Active Storage direct uploads to Google Cloud Storage IDs: CVE-2026-126085, GHSA-hfr4-8rjc-97m2 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-126085 (revision 2, source checked 11 Nov 2026, 07:35 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: activestorage 8.1.4.1, 8.0.5.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - RubyGems activestorage: affected >= 8.1.0.beta1, < 8.1.4.1; < 8.0.5.2; fixed in 8.0.5.2, 8.1.4.1 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - RubyGems activestorage: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on activestorage. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hfr4-8rjc-97m2 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-hfr4-8rjc-97m2 lists affected ranges: RubyGems activestorage >=8.1.0.beta1 =0 <8.0.5.2) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hfr4-8rjc-97m2 (OSV record GHSA-hfr4-8rjc-97m2 lists affected ranges: RubyGems activestorage >=8.1.0.beta1 =0 <8.0.5.2 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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