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High, CVSS 7.5amended

Action Pack: Possible Strong Parameters Bypass in Parameters#each_key

CVE-2026-126081GHSA-wm3x-v3qw-4jh3

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (actionpack 8.1.4.1, 8.0.5.2), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • RubyGems actionpack

    Affected
    >= 8.1.0.beta1, < 8.1.4.1< 8.0.5.2
    Fixed in
    8.0.5.2, 8.1.4.1

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
7.5 · CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-126081: 0.63% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 50.57 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-14). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact `ActionController::Parameters#each_key` delegates to the internal `ActiveSupport::HashWithIndifferentAccess` that holds the request parameters, so when called with a block it returns that hash instead of the `Parameters` instance. The hash does not respond to `permitted?`, so Active Model mass assignment (`new`, `assign_attributes`, `update`) accepts it without raising `ActiveModel::ForbiddenAttributesError`. An application that passes the return value of `each_key` to mass assignment could allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to set attributes that the application does not permit, such as an authorization flag. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2020-8164, which made `each`, `each_pair` and `each_value` return the `Parameters` instance but left `each_key` delegated.

Details The fixed releases define `Parameters#each_key` to yield each key and return the `Parameters` instance when given a block, as `each`,…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-wm3x-v3qw-4jh3

  2. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-wm3x-v3qw-4jh3

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-126081

Advisory: Action Pack: Possible Strong Parameters Bypass in Parameters#each_key
IDs: CVE-2026-126081, GHSA-wm3x-v3qw-4jh3
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-126081 (revision 2, source checked 13 Nov 2026, 06:40 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: actionpack 8.1.4.1, 8.0.5.2. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- RubyGems actionpack: affected >= 8.1.0.beta1, < 8.1.4.1; < 8.0.5.2; fixed in 8.0.5.2, 8.1.4.1

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- RubyGems actionpack: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on actionpack.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wm3x-v3qw-4jh3 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-wm3x-v3qw-4jh3 lists affected ranges: RubyGems actionpack >=8.1.0.beta1 =0 <8.0.5.2)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wm3x-v3qw-4jh3 (OSV record GHSA-wm3x-v3qw-4jh3 lists affected ranges: RubyGems actionpack >=8.1.0.beta1 =0 <8.0.5.2 (fixed))

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