Use-after-free in KV backends via leaked affinitypool::spawn_local future

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.

CVSS

7.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS

• CVE-2026-121417: 0.20% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 9.98 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-10). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

The `kv-mem`, `kv-surrealkv` and `kv-rocksdb` backends move non-`'static` borrowed state into affinity-pool closures through `affinitypool::spawn_local`: a `tokio::sync::MutexGuard >`, `&Transaction`, `&mut ScanStateKeys/Vals`, `&mut dyn KeyVisitor/ValVisitor`, `RwLockReadGuard`, and a `ReadOptions` holding a raw `rocksdb_snapshot_t*`. In `affinitypool 0.7.0` `spawn_local` is safe and erases the `'pool` lifetime via `async_task::Builder::spawn_unchecked`; the only thing keeping it sound is the `Drop` implementation of the returned future, which blocks until the worker stops using the borrows. Safe code can leak that future (`mem::forget`, `Box::leak`, `ManuallyDrop`, a reference cycle, or a leaked enclosing future). The borrows then end while the pool worker still uses them, producing a use-after-free on the transaction allocation; AddressSanitizer reports a read of freed mutex data and a write when the worker unlocks the freed `tokio::sync::Mutex` on the pool thread. No `unsafe` is…

Published by the source

19 Oct 2026, 12:00 UTC

Last modified by the source

6 Nov 2026, 15:55 UTC

Source last checked

7 Nov 2026, 06:30 UTC

1. Revision 1 · created · 7 Nov 2026

   Published from osv record RUSTSEC-2026-0453

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-121417

Advisory: Use-after-free in KV backends via leaked `affinitypool::spawn_local` future
IDs: CVE-2026-121417, GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-121417 (revision 1, source checked 7 Nov 2026, 06:30 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.8)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: surrealdb 3.3.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- crates.io surrealdb: affected >= 0.0.0-0, < 3.3.0; fixed in 3.3.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- crates.io surrealdb: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on surrealdb.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0453 (OSV record RUSTSEC-2026-0453 lists affected ranges: crates.io surrealdb >=0.0.0-0 <3.3.0 (fixed))

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