Happy DOM has cookie scope forgery: no DNS-label boundary on Domain= matching , attacker origin sets victim cookies
CVE-2026-118661GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (happy-dom 20.14.6), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm happy-dom
- Affected
- < 20.14.6
- Fixed in
- 20.14.6
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr lists affected ranges: npm happy-dom >=0 <20.14.6 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr lists affected ranges: npm happy-dom >=0 <=20.14.5
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 6.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-118661: 0.27% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 19.66 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary A cookie-scoping bug in happy-dom lets an attacker origin set cookies that a victim origin then receives, diverging from browser semantics.
Details happy-dom matches Domain=example.com against notexample.com (endsWith without a DNS-label boundary), diverging from browser semantics (verified 20.11.6 npm latest: cookieMatchesURL(Domain=example.com, url=http://notexample.com) = true). Relevant where happy-dom is used for SSR/prerender cookie handling. Matching in src/cookie/CookieContainer.ts.
PoC Run: ```bash node poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js ``` Full proof-of-concept source (poc-happydom-cookie-domain.js): ```js // PoC: happy-dom cookie-domain scoping gap -> cross-origin cookie injection / session fixation // Chain: app (window at http://localhost:PORT2) fetches attacker server (http://127.0.0.1:PORT1) // -> attacker Set-Cookie with Domain=localhost (a host that is NOT a suffix of 127.0.0.1) // -> happy-dom stores it (a real browser rejects: RFC 6265 §5.3.6-7 +…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-118661 Advisory: Happy DOM has cookie scope forgery: no DNS-label boundary on Domain= matching , attacker origin sets victim cookies IDs: CVE-2026-118661, GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-118661 (revision 2, source checked 29 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.5) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: happy-dom 20.14.6. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm happy-dom: affected < 20.14.6; fixed in 20.14.6 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls happy-dom --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on happy-dom. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr (OSV record GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr lists affected ranges: npm happy-dom >=0 <20.14.6 (fixed)) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-5fpq-26gf-qwcr lists affected ranges: npm happy-dom >=0 <=20.14.5) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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