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Medium, CVSS 5.9amended

Model Context Protocol Python SDK: HTTP client transports followed cross-origin redirects carrying custom headers and bodies

CVE-2026-116685GHSA-5h93-6whr-6q8j

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (mcp 2.2.0, 1.30.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

  • PyPI mcp

    Affected
    >= 2.0.0, < 2.2.0>= 1.8.0, < 1.30.0
    Fixed in
    2.2.0, 1.30.0

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
5.9 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-116685: 0.40% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 34.21 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary In affected versions, the SDK's Streamable HTTP and SSE client transports followed HTTP redirects to any host. If the configured MCP endpoint answered with a redirect to a different origin: - custom headers set on the client (for example an `X-API-Key` credential) were sent to that origin, and - on a `307` or `308` redirect the request body was re-sent there too. The SDK's OAuth client providers followed redirects on their own discovery, registration and token requests in the same way. A lone `Authorization` bearer header was not exposed; the HTTP library already drops it on cross-origin redirects. Anyone able to make an endpoint you trust redirect elsewhere (a stale redirect to a lapsed domain, a misrouted proxy rule, redirect logic an attacker can influence) could capture that material. A server that is itself malicious gains nothing this way; it already receives your requests directly.

Am I affected? Yes, if your code uses the SDK as an MCP client over HTTP through…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-5h93-6whr-6q8j

  2. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-5h93-6whr-6q8j

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-116685

Advisory: Model Context Protocol Python SDK: HTTP client transports followed cross-origin redirects carrying custom headers and bodies
IDs: CVE-2026-116685, GHSA-5h93-6whr-6q8j
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-116685 (revision 2, source checked 28 Oct 2026, 06:05 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.9)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: mcp 2.2.0, 1.30.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- PyPI mcp: affected >= 2.0.0, < 2.2.0; >= 1.8.0, < 1.30.0; fixed in 2.2.0, 1.30.0

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `python -m pip show mcp`: prints the installed version. Run with the environment that serves production active.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on mcp.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5h93-6whr-6q8j (OSV record GHSA-5h93-6whr-6q8j lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp >=2.0.0 =1.8.0 <1.30.0 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5h93-6whr-6q8j (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-5h93-6whr-6q8j lists affected ranges: PyPI mcp >=2.0.0 =1.8.0 <1.30.0)

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