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Critical, CVSS 9.1amended

better-auth: OAuth state can be used as a Magic Link to sign in as another user

CVE-2026-114607GHSA-965c-763c-88jm

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (better-auth 1.7.7), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • npm better-auth

    Affected
    >= 1.4.0-beta.18, < 1.7.7
    Fixed in
    1.7.7

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
9.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-110862: 0.32% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 25.17 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
  • CVE-2026-114607: 0.42% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 36.33 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Am I affected? You may be affected if you use `better-auth` from `1.4.0-beta.18` through versions before `1.7.7` with the Magic Link plugin and social or Generic OAuth sign-in. You are affected if all of these are true: - Magic Link is enabled with default `storeToken: "plain"`, or with `storeToken: "hashed"` and global `verification.storeIdentifier: "hashed"` (including a hashed default). - At least one built-in social provider or Generic OAuth provider is enabled. - OAuth state uses `account.storeStateStrategy: "database"`, the default when a database or secondary storage is configured. Cookie-backed state blocks this path, subject to the OAuth Proxy condition below. With custom hashers, confirm the flows cannot resolve to the same stored identifier.

Summary Better Auth accepts an OAuth sign-in state value as a Magic Link token. An attacker can start an OAuth sign-in with any email address and use the returned state value to finish a Magic Link sign-in for that address.…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GHSA-965c-763c-88jm

  2. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from ghsa record GHSA-965c-763c-88jm

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-114607

Advisory: better-auth: OAuth state can be used as a Magic Link to sign in as another user
IDs: CVE-2026-114607, GHSA-965c-763c-88jm
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-114607 (revision 2, source checked 28 Oct 2026, 06:00 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: better-auth 1.7.7. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- npm better-auth: affected >= 1.4.0-beta.18, < 1.7.7; fixed in 1.7.7

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- `npm ls better-auth --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on better-auth.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-965c-763c-88jm (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-965c-763c-88jm lists affected ranges: npm better-auth >=1.4.0-beta.18 <1.7.7)
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-965c-763c-88jm (OSV record GHSA-965c-763c-88jm lists affected ranges: npm better-auth >=1.4.0-beta.18 <1.7.7 (fixed))

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