chi: Client IP spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For
CVE-2026-114437GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 5.4.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
- Affected
- <= 5.3.2
- Fixed in
- 5.4.0
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 >=0 <5.4.0 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 >=0 <=5.3.2
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 4.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-114437: 0.13% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 2.60 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary ClientIPFromXFF skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP. The attack is remote and requires one unauthenticated HTTP request with no user interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). It changes security decisions and exposes one protected handler within the same application (S:U/C:L/I:L); no availability loss was observed (A:N). Preconditions: The application uses ClientIPFromXFF and makes the origin server reachable by an anonymous client outside the configured trusted-proxy CIDRs. No victim interaction is required. 1. Send GET /admin directly to the origin with no X-Forwarded-For header. 2. Observe a 403 Forbidden response and an empty derived client IP. 3. Repeat the request with X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.7,…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-114437 Advisory: chi: Client IP spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For IDs: CVE-2026-114437, GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3 Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-114437 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:32 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 4.8) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 5.4.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v5: affected <= 5.3.2; fixed in 5.4.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v5: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on github.com/go-chi/chi/v5. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3 (OSV record GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 >=0 <5.4.0 (fixed)) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 >=0 <=5.3.2) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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