ApostropheCMS: CAPTCHA response token not URL-encoded
CVE-2026-113667GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (@apostrophecms/login-recaptcha 1.2.1; @apostrophecms/login-hcaptcha 1.3.0; @apostrophecms/form 1.5.5), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
npm @apostrophecms/login-recaptcha
- Affected
- < 1.2.1
- Fixed in
- 1.2.1
npm @apostrophecms/login-hcaptcha
- Affected
- < 1.3.0
- Fixed in
- 1.3.0
- Affected
- < 1.5.5
- Fixed in
- 1.5.5
Sources
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq lists affected ranges: npm @apostrophecms/form >=0 =0 =0 <1.3.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq lists affected ranges: npm @apostrophecms/form >=0 =0 =0 <1.3.0 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 5.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-113667: 0.37% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 30.47 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Summary Form and login CAPTCHA verification interpolate the user-supplied widget token unencoded into the server-side verification URL/body, allowing a crafted token to inject query parameters into the reCAPTCHA/hCaptcha verify request. Details - packages/form/lib/recaptcha.js:39 — recaptchaUri = 'https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api/siteverify?secret=${recaptchaSecret}&response=${input.recaptcha}' - packages/login-recaptcha/index.js:44 — same pattern for login - packages/login-hcaptcha/index.js:47 — body: 'response=${token}&secret=${secret}' PoC Impact Low: a crafted token smuggles extra key=value pairs (secret, extra response) into the outbound verify call, forcing verification failures (DoS of the captcha gate and of captcha-gated login/form flows) and enabling automated bypass probing; no secret exfiltration. Remediation — Build the verify request with URL + searchParams (or encodeURIComponent on both secret and response), and validate the token against ^[A-Za-z0-9.-]{1,2048}$…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 4 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from osv record GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from ghsa record GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-113667 Advisory: ApostropheCMS: CAPTCHA response token not URL-encoded IDs: CVE-2026-113667, GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-113667 (revision 4, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 13:07 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.3) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: @apostrophecms/login-recaptcha 1.2.1; @apostrophecms/login-hcaptcha 1.3.0; @apostrophecms/form 1.5.5. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - npm @apostrophecms/login-recaptcha: affected < 1.2.1; fixed in 1.2.1 - npm @apostrophecms/login-hcaptcha: affected < 1.3.0; fixed in 1.3.0 - npm @apostrophecms/form: affected < 1.5.5; fixed in 1.5.5 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - `npm ls @apostrophecms/login-recaptcha --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. - `npm ls @apostrophecms/login-hcaptcha --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. - `npm ls @apostrophecms/form --all`: lists every installed copy and version, including transitive ones. Run in the project root after `npm ci`. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on @apostrophecms/login-recaptcha, @apostrophecms/login-hcaptcha, @apostrophecms/form. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq lists affected ranges: npm @apostrophecms/form >=0 =0 =0 <1.3.0) - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq (OSV record GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq lists affected ranges: npm @apostrophecms/form >=0 =0 =0 <1.3.0 (fixed)) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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