A russh SSH server accepts a publickey authentication whose signature uses a different algorithm than the one named in the request
CVE-2026-111062GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf
What to do
Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (russh 0.64.0), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
crates.io russh
- Affected
- >= 0.34.0-beta.1, < 0.64.0
- Fixed in
- 0.64.0
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf lists affected ranges: crates.io russh >=0.34.0-beta.1 <0.64.0 (fixed)
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf lists affected ranges: crates.io russh >=0.34.0-beta.1 <0.64.0
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS 4.0
- 2.3 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
- EPSS
- No dated EPSS signal available.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Details In russh/src/server/encrypted.rs, serverreadauthrequestpk (0.63.3, around lines 880-990): The requested algorithm name (pubkeyalgo) is read and only used to decode the key: PublicKeyOrCertificate::decode(&pubkeyalgo, &pubkeykey). The derived hashalg is then dropped (PublicKeyOrCertificate::PublicKey { ref key, .. }). The signature blob is decoded (Signature::decode) and verified with Verifier::verify(&pubkey, &buf, &sig). ssh-key picks the hash from the signature's own algorithm (sig.algorithm()). pubkeyalgo and sig.algorithm() are never compared. So for an RSA key, the request can say rsa-sha2-512 while the signature is ssh-rsa. The signature is valid for SHA-1, verification succeeds, and Handler::authpublickey is called. Affected versions: every russh release, from the first (0.34.0-beta.1, 2022-03) through 0.63.3 and current main. The behaviour is inherited from thrussh, which russh was forked from. The mechanism changed over time, but the outcome is the same: the hash is…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 3 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-111062 Advisory: A russh SSH server accepts a publickey authentication whose signature uses a different algorithm than the one named in the request IDs: CVE-2026-111062, GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-111062 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:43 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Low (CVSS 2.3) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: russh 0.64.0. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - crates.io russh: affected >= 0.34.0-beta.1, < 0.64.0; fixed in 0.64.0 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - crates.io russh: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on russh. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf (OSV record GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf lists affected ranges: crates.io russh >=0.34.0-beta.1 <0.64.0 (fixed)) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j7h2-66j4-ghjf lists affected ranges: crates.io russh >=0.34.0-beta.1 <0.64.0) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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