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High, CVSS 7.5amended

Nginx UI: Self-upgrade runs an unsigned binary verified only by a same-origin digest → RCE via a compromised mirror or MITM

CVE-2026-107812GHSA-662p-52hx-cmh2

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI 1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • Go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

    Affected
    >= 1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1, < 1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8
    Fixed in
    1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-107812: 0.18% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 6.95 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary The self-upgrade downloads the release binary and its checksum (.tar.gz and .tar.gz.digest) through the SAME endpoint (version.GetUrl(), which is githubproxy or, by default, the project's cloud.nginxui.com mirror), and verifies the binary ONLY by comparing it to that digest: digestFileContent == DigestSHA512(tarName). Both the binary and the digest come from the same origin, and there is NO cryptographic signature / public-key verification. The downloaded binary then replaces the running executable (selfupdate.CommitBinary) and the process restarts, so the binary runs as the nginx-ui user (typically root). Because integrity rests only on a digest fetched from the same place as the binary, anyone who controls that download path can substitute a malicious binary plus a matching digest and obtain code execution as root on the next upgrade. Additionally, the githubproxy setting accepts http:// URLs, so the binary+digest can be fetched over cleartext. Affected code -…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-662p-52hx-cmh2

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GO-2026-6705

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-662p-52hx-cmh2

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-107812

Advisory: Nginx UI: Self-upgrade runs an unsigned binary verified only by a same-origin digest → RCE via a compromised mirror or MITM
IDs: CVE-2026-107812, GHSA-662p-52hx-cmh2
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-107812 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:32 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI 1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI: affected >= 1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1, < 1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8; fixed in 1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6705 (OSV record GO-2026-6705 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI >=1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1 <1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8 (fixed))
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-662p-52hx-cmh2 (OSV record GHSA-662p-52hx-cmh2 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI >=1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1 <1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-662p-52hx-cmh2 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-662p-52hx-cmh2 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI >=1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1 <1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8)

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