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High, CVSS 8.1amended

Nginx UI: Authentication bypass: password login does not enforce a passkey-only second factor (2FA bypass)

CVE-2026-107808GHSA-45gv-9wjv-xh7p

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

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Affected packages

  • Go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

    Affected
    >= 1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1, < 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814
    Fixed in
    1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
8.1 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-107808: 0.41% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 35.57 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary nginx-ui supports two second-factor methods — TOTP (OTP) and WebAuthn passkeys — and reports an account as 2FA-enabled when either is configured. However, the password login endpoint (POST /api/login) only enforces a second factor when a TOTP secret is present. An account that has registered a passkey but no TOTP is logged in after password verification alone — the passkey is never requested. This silently downgrades a passkey-protected account to single-factor (password-only) authentication. Details The account's 2FA policy treats passkeys as a valid factor (model/user.go): But the login handler only checks EnabledOTP() (api/user/auth.go, Login): No branch requires a WebAuthn assertion during password login when EnabledPasskey() is true. The root cause is the mismatch between the policy definition (Enabled2FA() = OTP or passkey) and the enforcement check (EnabledOTP() only). The same EnabledOTP()-only gating in RequireSecureSession() (internal/middleware/securesession.go)…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-45gv-9wjv-xh7p

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GO-2026-6704

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-45gv-9wjv-xh7p

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-107808

Advisory: Nginx UI: Authentication bypass: password login does not enforce a passkey-only second factor (2FA bypass)
IDs: CVE-2026-107808, GHSA-45gv-9wjv-xh7p
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-107808 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:32 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.1)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI: affected >= 1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1, < 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814; fixed in 1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6704 (OSV record GO-2026-6704 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI >=1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1 <1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814 (fixed))
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-45gv-9wjv-xh7p (OSV record GHSA-45gv-9wjv-xh7p lists affected ranges: Go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI >=1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1 <1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-45gv-9wjv-xh7p (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-45gv-9wjv-xh7p lists affected ranges: Go github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI >=1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1 <1.9.10-0.20260728074558-95cd21b70814)

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