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High, CVSS 8.7amended

AsyncHttpClient: Digest challenge without a usable nonce downgrades to Basic and sends the password in cleartext

CVE-2026-107231GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client 3.0.13, 2.16.1), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS 4.0
8.7 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N · score source
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-107231: 0.24% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 14.81 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Impact A Digest challenge that does not yield a usable nonce is treated as a Basic challenge. The client then answers it with Authorization: Basic, which carries the username and password base64 encoded and so recoverable by anyone who sees the request. Any of these is enough, sent by whoever writes the 401 or 407: The challenge announces itself as Digest, so it passes the check that would otherwise reject a non-Digest challenge for a Digest realm. It then fails to produce a nonce, and the absence of a nonce is what selected Basic. A server offering plain Basic to a Digest realm gets nothing, so labelling the challenge Digest and leaving the nonce out is what makes the difference. This is reachable by anyone who can write the challenge: a malicious or compromised origin, a proxy, or an attacker on a plaintext hop. Digest exists precisely to keep the password off those hops. A server that stores only HA1, and anyone impersonating the real origin, does not otherwise learn the password…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Reviewed OSV alias/range/CVSS4 correction; package source scopes and original publication preserved. No customer finding resolved.

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-107231

Advisory: AsyncHttpClient: Digest challenge without a usable nonce downgrades to Basic and sends the password in cleartext
IDs: CVE-2026-107231, GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-107231 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 16:58 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 8.7)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client 3.0.13, 2.16.1. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Maven org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client: affected >= 3.0.0.Beta1, <= 3.0.12; >= 2.0.0, <= 2.16.0; fixed in 2.16.1, 3.0.13

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Maven org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4 (OSV record GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4 lists affected ranges: Maven org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client >=3.0.0.Beta1 =2.0.0 <2.16.1 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4 (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-rqf5-2wxv-rjf4 lists affected ranges: Maven org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client >=3.0.0.Beta1 =2.0.0 <=2.16.0)

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