AsyncHttpClient CookieStore Silently Overrides Caller's Explicit Cookie Header via setHeader (Bypass of CVE-2024-53990 Fix)
CVE-2026-107228GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf
What to do
Partial vendor fix. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check back for a fix.
This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.
Affected packages
Maven org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
- Affected
- >= 3.0.0, <= 3.0.13>= 2.1.0, <= 2.16.1
- Fixed in
- 3.0.14
Sources
- Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV.dev), including the GitHub Advisory Database
OSV record GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf lists affected ranges: Maven org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client >=3.0.0 =2.1.0 <=2.16.1
VerifiedObserved Structured OSV record; GitHub-reviewed advisory.
- GitHub Advisory Database and maintainer security advisories on GitHub
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf lists affected ranges: Maven org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client >=3.0.0 =2.1.0 <=2.16.1
VerifiedObserved Structured GitHub Advisory Database record (type=reviewed) from the GitHub REST API.
Severity and exploitation
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
- CVSS
- 6.8 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- CVE-2026-107228: 0.30% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 22.91 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description
As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.
Impact With the cookie store enabled, which is the default, a Cookie header that the caller sets on a request with setHeader or addHeader is thrown away whenever the store holds any cookie for the request's origin: the request's cookie list is written into that header afterwards and replaces it. CVE-2024-53990 fixed the same problem for cookies added with addCookie, but that fix works on the cookie list, and a header set directly never reaches it. This is not limited to a cookie of the same name. A store cookie of any name erases the caller's header, so a request meant to carry the caller's session cookie goes out with only the store's cookies, and where the store has a cookie of the caller's name, the store's value is sent instead. It matters most where one client acts for several users. An application that puts each user's session on the request itself, and shares one client and its default cookie store, sends one user's request with a session cookie the store took from a response…
Dates and revisions
- Published by the source
- Last modified by the source
- Source last checked
- Revision 2 · amended ·
Amended from ghsa record GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf
- Revision 1 · created ·
Published from osv record GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf
Agent brief
Preview the exact text before you copy it. Commands are read-only suggestions; review them before running anything.
# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-107228 Advisory: AsyncHttpClient CookieStore Silently Overrides Caller's Explicit Cookie Header via setHeader (Bypass of CVE-2024-53990 Fix) IDs: CVE-2026-107228, GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-107228 (revision 2, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 16:58 UTC) Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected. Severity: Medium (CVSS 6.8) Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV. Vendor response: Partial vendor fix; fixed versions by package: org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client 3.0.14. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed. ## Affected components - Maven org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client: affected >= 3.0.0, <= 3.0.13; >= 2.1.0, <= 2.16.1; fixed in 3.0.14 ## Suggested inspection (read-only) - Maven org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client: check the installed version with your package manager. ## Supported action No complete vendor fix is recorded. Follow the primary source's mitigation guidance and check this record again before closing anything. ## Required regression checks - Run the test suite and a production build. - Exercise the features that depend on org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client. - Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed. ## Rollback considerations - Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward. ## Unresolved questions - Which deployments run an affected version? - Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority. - Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production. ## Sources - Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf (OSV record GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf lists affected ranges: Maven org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client >=3.0.0 =2.1.0 <=2.16.1) - Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-2jwh-9rmr-j4xf lists affected ranges: Maven org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client >=3.0.0 =2.1.0 <=2.16.1) Commands are suggestions: review each one before running it.
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