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High, CVSS 7.5amended

Excelize ANCHORARRAY: mutually-referencing array formulas recurse unboundedly via re-entrant CalcCellValue, causing a fatal stack overflow

CVE-2026-107216GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r

What to do

Vendor fix available. Upgrade each affected package to the fixed version on its release line (github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 2.11.1-0.20260911060113-ea12859e43c6), redeploy, then verify what is actually installed.

This page has no inventory attached, so it cannot say whether you are affected. A vendor fix is not proof that your deployment is fixed.

Affected packages

Sources

Severity and exploitation
Exploitation
No confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next marks exploitation only from CISA KEV.
CVSS
7.5 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
EPSS
  • CVE-2026-107216: 0.38% estimated exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 31.54 (FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-03). This is a model estimate, not proof of exploitation or customer exposure.
Source description

As published by the source; long descriptions are shortened.

Summary ANCHORARRAY (calc.go:15137 on current master) evaluates each cell of the referenced spill range by calling the exported CalcCellValue, which unconditionally constructs a fresh calcContext — fresh entry marker, fresh iterations map, full MaxCalcIterations budget (calc.go:896-900). The circular-reference control only exists within one context: the entry-exclusion marker and per-ref iteration budget are fields of that single context, and completion-based caching (formulaArgCache/calcRawCache) only ever stores results of evaluations that finish. During a pure cycle no nested evaluation ever finishes, so nothing is ever cached to break the recursion, and each hop re-arms the entire budget. Two ordinary, Excel-legal constructs in an attacker-supplied workbook are enough: - A1 (dynamic array formula, ref A1:A1): xlfn.ANCHORARRAY($B$1) - B1 (dynamic array formula, ref B1:B1): xlfn.ANCHORARRAY($A$1) → CalcCellValue → calcCellValue → evalInfixExp → parseReference → cellResolver → … →…

Dates and revisions
Published by the source
Last modified by the source
Source last checked
  1. Revision 3 · amended ·

    Amended from ghsa record GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r

  2. Revision 2 · amended ·

    Amended from osv record GO-2026-6688

  3. Revision 1 · created ·

    Published from osv record GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r

Agent brief

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# Patch Next advisory brief: CVE-2026-107216

Advisory: Excelize ANCHORARRAY: mutually-referencing array formulas recurse unboundedly via re-entrant CalcCellValue, causing a fatal stack overflow
IDs: CVE-2026-107216, GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r
Record: https://patchnext.com/advisories/cve-2026-107216 (revision 3, source checked 26 Oct 2026, 15:29 UTC)
Inventory: none attached. This brief comes from a public page and does not say whether any deployment is affected.
Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)
Exploitation: no confirmed exploitation recorded. Patch Next confirms exploitation only from CISA KEV.
Vendor response: Vendor fix available; fixed versions by package: github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 2.11.1-0.20260911060113-ea12859e43c6. A vendor fix does not mean a deployment is fixed.

## Affected components
- Go github.com/xuri/excelize/v2: affected >= 2.8.1, < 2.11.1-0.20260911060113-ea12859e43c6; fixed in 2.11.1-0.20260911060113-ea12859e43c6

## Suggested inspection (read-only)
- Go github.com/xuri/excelize/v2: check the installed version with your package manager.

## Supported action
Upgrade each affected component to a fixed version on its release line. For a transitive dependency, upgrade the parent package or add an override or constraint, then regenerate the lockfile. Redeploy every environment that ran an affected version.

## Required regression checks
- Run the test suite and a production build.
- Exercise the features that depend on github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.
- Repeat the inspection and confirm that only fixed versions remain installed.

## Rollback considerations
- Keep the previous lockfile and deployment artifact. Rolling back reinstates the vulnerable version, so apply any documented mitigation while you fix forward.

## Unresolved questions
- Which deployments run an affected version?
- Exploitation status can change. Check again before lowering the priority.
- Mark the work resolved only after the fixed version is verified in production.

## Sources
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6688 (OSV record GO-2026-6688 lists affected ranges: Go github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 >=2.8.1 <2.11.1-0.20260911060113-ea12859e43c6 (fixed))
- Verified: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r (OSV record GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r lists affected ranges: Go github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 >=2.8.1 <2.11.1-0.20260911060113-ea12859e43c6 (fixed))
- Verified: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r (GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r lists affected ranges: Go github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 >=2.8.1 <2.11.1-0.20260911060113-ea12859e43c6)

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